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Government Discretion Advised
(Even If It’s Unconstitutional): How
the Eleventh Circuit Has Expanded
the United States’s Immunity from
Tort Suits
John Rodriquez*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mackie Shivers, a sixty-four-year-old man, was stabbed in the eye by
his mentally-ill cellmate with a pair of scissors.1 Although the attack left
Shivers permanently blind, he received no legal remedy to compensate
him for his injuries.2 This result is due, at least in part, to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to interpret
the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act
(FTCA)3 in a broader way than virtually all of its sister circuits.4 The
holding by the Eleventh Circuit in Shivers v. United States bars FTCA
claims under the exception even for unconstitutional conduct by
government employees so long as the conduct was discretionary.5
Congress passed the FTCA in order to hold the government liable for
the misconduct of government employees acting within the scope of their
employment.6 The discretionary function exception to the FTCA was
*A special thanks to Professor Painter-Thorne who provided me with invaluable feedback
during the drafting of this Casenote. I am grateful for all my family and friends that have
supported me throughout my law school career. I could not have done this without them.
1. Shivers v. United States, 1 F.4th 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2021).
2. Id. at 927, 936.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2013).
4. The only other circuit to hold that the discretionary function exception applies even
when the action taken by a federal employee is unconstitutional is the Seventh Circuit. See
Linder v. United States, 937 F.3d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 2019).
5. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 930.
6. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
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intended to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative decisions that
have their roots in public policy.7 By holding that this exception applies
to even unconstitutional conduct, the Eleventh Circuit has left many
future tort victims without a proper redress for injuries caused by the
misfeasance of government employees and has implied that there is some
kind of policy rationale for such employees to be given discretion to
violate the Constitution.
Because the Supreme Court of the United States has yet to rule on
whether unconstitutional conduct falls under the discretionary function
exception, the circuit courts have been left to answer the question on
their own. Virtually every circuit that has broached the issue presented
in Shivers has held that unconstitutional conduct is not protected by the
exception.8 The Eleventh Circuit has now joined the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in holding the opposite.9
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mackie Shivers was a sixty-four-year-old inmate at a federal prison in
Florida.10 Prison officials assigned Marvin Dodson, a twenty-six-year-old,
mentally unstable inmate to share Shivers’s cell. Both inmates were
imprisoned for cocaine drug convictions. Eight months passed with no
incident between the two cellmates until Dodson stabbed Shivers in the
eye with a pair of scissors while Shivers was asleep. The attack left
Shivers permanently blind in that eye.11
After the incident, Shivers pursued his available administrative
remedies. Another inmate, Gordan Reid, helped him in this endeavor.12
Both men agreed that Shivers completed the first three steps of the
process—he informed the prison staff of the issue, submitted a written
Request for Administrative Remedy (form BP-9) to the warden, and then
submitted an Administrative Remedy Appeal (form BP-10) to the
designated regional director. Shivers received denials at each stage.
Shivers believed he had properly submitted an appeal to the General
Counsel at Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) Central Office—the final step of the

7. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467
U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
8. See Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 938–39 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Limone v.
United States, 579 F.3d 79, 102 (1st Cir. 2009); Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 948 (8th
Cir. 2003).
9. See Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 1972).
10. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 927.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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administrative process—but the government claimed at trial that the
form was never received.13
Under the impression he had exhausted all administrative remedies,
Shivers then brought a FTCA and a Bivens action14 against the United
States and five prison employees.15 Shivers’s complaint alleged that the
prison officials knew or should have known that Dodson was showing
violent tendencies toward other inmates and had a history of assaulting
his cellmates before the man was assigned to Shivers’s cell. Shivers’s
complaint also alleged that he informed prison officials, prior to the
stabbing, that he was afraid for his safety. He claimed that the prison
officials choice to move Dodson into his cell was negligent and that his
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated.16
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
dismissed Shivers’s FTCA claim against the United States for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the conduct exercised by the
prison officials fell under the discretionary function exception, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a), to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.17 The court also
dismissed, without prejudice, the Bivens claim against the five prison
officials due to Shivers’s failure to exhaust all his administrative
remedies. Shivers appealed both dismissals, and on June 9, 2021, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s dismissal of both claims.18 Ultimately, the court’s decision
in this case allows the discretionary function exception to shield
government employees who violate the Constitution from liability under
the FTCA.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Torts Claim Act
The United States, as a sovereign entity, is immune from suit without
the consent of Congress.19 In 1946, Congress passed the FTCA as Title
IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 60 Stat. 842.20 Congress had

13. Id.
14. A Bivens claim is a cause of action against a government employee for an alleged
violation of the constitutional rights of another. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
15. Shivers, 1 F.4th at 927.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 928.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
20. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24.
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considered such an act for nearly thirty years as a mechanism to hold the
government liable for the misfeasance of federal employees while acting
in the scope of their duties.21 Prior tort claim bills that Congress
considered included waiver of sovereign immunity in specific realms of
federal activity, such as “postal service, the activities of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, or the collection of taxes.”22 Two years
earlier, Congress had drafted two exceptions to tort claims dealing with
“the execution of a regulation or statute or on the exercise of a
discretionary function.”23 This was done to ensure the government would
not be liable for torts arising from “errors in administration or in the
exercise of discretionary functions.”24 The necessity of these exceptions
was clarified by an Assistant Attorney General who appeared before
Congress to explain that legally authorized activities do not give rise to
a tort action against the government “merely because ‘the same conduct
by a private individual would be tortious.’”25 The FTCA was not intended
to allow the “constitutionality of legislation, the legality of regulations,
or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act” to be secondguessed by the courts in a tort claim.26
When Congress passed the FTCA, it waived sovereign immunity for
injury or loss caused by “the negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a
government employee “while acting within the scope of [their] office or
employment . . . .”27 In a 1994 case, FDIC v. Meyer, 28 the Supreme Court
held that constitutional tort claims are not cognizable under the FTCA
when standing absent from a state tort claim. The Court stated that, in
order for a claim to be actionable under the FTCA, a party must show
that the United States would be liable to the plaintiff as a private person
would be under the “law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.”29 The Court has continuously held that the “law of the place”
language found in the statute means the law of the state in which the
alleged injury occurred.30 The Court in Meyer went on to say the source
of liability for a claim alleging a breach of a federal constitutional right

21. Id.
22. Id. at 26
23. Id.
24. Id. at 26–7.
25. Id. at 27 (quoting Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, p. 6, 28).
26. Id. at 27.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
28. 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994).
29. Id. at 477.
30. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963).

2022

GOVERNMENT DISCRETION ADVISED

1517

is, by definition, federal law and not state law.31 Thus, the FTCA was
enacted to provide a remedy for those individuals injured by state torts
committed by federal employees.32 However, the FTCA was not intended
as a route to enforce federal statutory duties.33 Although the Supreme
Court has held that constitutional tort claims are not actionable under
the FTCA when standing alone, it has yet to decide on the actionability
of FTCA claims which have their basis in state tort law and are paired
with a violation of constitutional rights.
B. The Discretionary Function Exception and the Two-Part Test
Although the FTCA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity, it is
limited by exemptions that potentially deprive federal courts of subject
matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim.34 Of relevance here is the
FTCA’s exemption of “[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”35 This exception is
more commonly called the “discretionary function” exception.36 The
purpose of this exception is to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic,
and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.”37 Congress
intended to strike a balance between its “willingness to impose tort
liability upon the United States” and its desire to allow the government
to engage in certain activities without the threat of suit by private
individuals.38 Congress took steps to avoid subjecting the government to
liability for its employees’ discretionary acts that would seriously
encumber efficient government operations.39 The Supreme Court has
concluded that it is impossible to define with infallible precision every
aspect of the discretionary function exception.40

31. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478.
32. Ochran v. United States, 273 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001).
33. Howell v. United States, 932 F.2d 915, 917 (11th Cir. 1991).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006); see Evergreen Marine, Ltd v. United States, 789 F. App’x
798, 800 (11th Cir. 2019).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
36. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991).
37. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814.
38. Id. at 808.
39. Id. at 814.
40. Id. at 813.
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There is, however, a way to determine if the exception applies in a
specific case.41 In Gaubert, the Supreme Court used a two-prong test to
determine whether challenged conduct falls within the discretionaryfunction exception.42 The court must first ascertain if the conduct is
“discretionary in nature,” meaning it involves an “element of judgment
or choice.”43 This “nature of the conduct” is the controlling factor in
determining whether the exception applies and not the status of the
actor.44 The requirement of judgment or choice is not met if there is a
federal statute, regulation, or policy that details a course of action for an
employee to follow, such as a case in which the employee has no other
option but to follow the directive.45 The inquiry further focuses on
whether the controlling statute mandates a specific manner in which the
government agent should perform their function.46
Once an act is found to involve an element of judgment or choice, the
court must ask “whether that judgment is of the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”47 In light of the
purpose of the exception, the Supreme Court has held that it protects
only governmental actions and decisions that have some basis in public
policy.48 The discretionary function exception is intended to protect the
government from liability if the conduct in question entails the
permissible exercise of policy judgment.49 When a government policy
allows for its agents to exercise discretion, it is presumed that the agent’s
actions are grounded in some sort of governmental policy rationale.50
Indeed, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege
facts that the conduct in controversy is not grounded in the policy of a
regulatory regime.51 Overall, the second prong of the test looks at
whether the challenged actions are susceptible of policy analysis.52

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23.
Id. (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813.
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
Hughes v. United States, 110 F.3d 765, 768 (11th Cir. 1997).
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23.
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537.
Id.
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324.
Id. at 324–25.
Id. at 325.
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C. Bivens Claim
In 1971, the Supreme Court held that a federal cause of action for
damages could arise from the violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment
rights by a federal agent.53 Such Bivens-type remedies were later
recognized in a Fifth Amendment gender discrimination case54 and in an
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment case.55 In each of
those cases, the Court held that there was an implied damages remedy
under the Constitution itself.56 When such a claim is brought by a prison
inmate, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA) requires that
prisoners exhaust all available administrative remedies.57 Compliance
with the prison grievance process is required in order to properly exhaust
available remedies under the PLRA.58
The BOP has a three-level administrative remedy procedure.59 The
inmate must first make his issue known to the prison staff.60 If the
matter is not resolved, the inmate may submit a written Request for
Administrative Remedy (form BP-9) to the warden.61 If the inmate is not
satisfied with the warden’s response, he can submit an Administrative
Remedy Appeal (form BP-10) to the designated Regional Director.62 The
final step is to appeal to the General Counsel at BOP’s Central Office
(form BP-11).63
The Eleventh Circuit has held that a failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies under the PLRA should be treated as a matter
of abatement as opposed to an adjudication on the merits.64 Deciding on
a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a
two-step process. The first step is to look at the factual allegations made
by each party and if they conflict, take the facts in favor of the plaintiff.
If in this light the defendant is entitled to dismissal for failure to exhaust,
then the claim must be dismissed. If the complaint is not subject to

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2017).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2013).
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217 (2007).
See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10, 542.13(a), 542.14(a), 542.15(a).
28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a) (2006).
28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a) (2018).
28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a) (2018).
Id.
Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008).
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dismissal, the court must make specific findings to resolve the factual
issue.65
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Shivers, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed, as a matter of first
impression, whether the FTCA’s discretionary function exception
protects a government employee from liability if they violate the
Constitution.66 In its interpretation of the FTCA and the discretionary
function exception, the court held that even unconstutional conduct by
government employees can be protected by the exception, with one judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.67
A. The Court Tackles the Federal Tort Claim Act
The court began its discussion of the FTCA claim by mentioning that
the United States is immune from suit unless Congress consents to suit.68
It then looked at the language of the statute and referenced the Meyer
case, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s holding that the FTCA addresses
violations of state law by federal employees and not constitutional
claims.69
Shivers argued that, due to the violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights, the discretionary function exception does not apply to the prison
employees’ decision to house him with Dodson.70 On that point, Shivers
contended that prison officials do not have the discretion to act
unconstitutionally and therefore the action taken in this case falls out of
the scope of the exception. Further, Shivers stated that the underlying
law for his FTCA claim was Florida law and the unconstitutional conduct
by the prison officials only served to negate the government’s
discretionary function defense.71
Rejecting Shiver’s claim, the court stated that an FTCA claim cannot
be used to circumvent the limitations on constitutional tort claims under
Bivens.72 Such circumvention would happen by recasting the same
allegations “(1) as a common-law tort claim under the FTCA that is not
subject to the discretionary function exception or (2) as negating the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
See Shivers, 1 F.4th at 924.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 928.
Id. (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477–78).
Id. at 929.
Id.
Id. at 931.
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discretionary function exception.”73 To support its reasoning, the court
cited two cases from the Seventh Circuit that ruled on the issue at hand.74
One of these Seventh Circuit cases, Linder, stated that the limited scope
of the FTCA and its inapplicability to constitutional torts was partially
the reason the Supreme Court created Bivens actions against individual
government employees.75
B. The Discretionary Function Exception and the Two-Part Test
Next, the court discussed the intent behind the discretionary function
exception and how to apply the Gaubert test. The court started its
analysis of the discretionary function exception by looking at the plain
language of FTCA. It drew special attention to the language that states
the FTCA “shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim” that originates from a
discretionary function or duty exercised by government employees,
“whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”76 The court reasoned
that the language Congress chose is unqualified, and nothing in the
statute limited the exception based on the degree of the abuse of the
discretion. It pointed out that Congress could have used language that
would state what kinds of abuse would not fall under this exception, such
as grossly negligent behavior or behavior that is unconstitutional.
However, Congress did not include such language, and Congress alone
decides what should fall within its waiver of sovereign immunity. The
crucial question for the court in respect to the plaintiff’s FTCA claim was
whether the government activity being challenged in the case was
discretionary under Gaubert.77
The court used the term “constitutional-claims exclusion” to refer to
Shivers’s argument for why this claim should be actionable under the
FTCA.78 It opined that Congress did not leave room for this extra-textual
exclusion.79 It then cited Millbrook v. United States,80 in which the
Supreme Court read the plain language of the FTCA and refused to read
a limitation into unambiguous text.81 The court pointed to the remedial
scheme of the FTCA and claimed that it is incompatible with Shivers’s
proposed exception, which is reinforced by Congress’ intent when
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 933 (quoting Linder, 937 F.3d at 1090).
Id. at 930 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id.
569 U.S. 50 (2013).
Shivers, 1 F.4th at 930; Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 57.
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creating the Act. The court reasoned that the purpose behind the Act is
to address violations of state law torts by federal employees and not
constitutional violations.82
To illustrate why there is no “constitutional claims exclusion,” the
court referenced two Seventh Circuit cases, Kiiskila and Linder.83 In
both Kiiskila and Linder, a claim under the FTCA was brought for a state
tort claim that involved an alleged violation of federal constitutional
rights.84 Both claims were dismissed by the Seventh Circuit based on the
discretionary function exception.85 The Seventh Circuit in both Kiiskila
and Linder concluded that, even when a government employee uses their
discretion in a way that violates another’s constitutional rights, the plain
language of the FTCA does not waive the government’s immunity to
suit.86
The court in Shivers then analyzed the two-prong test seen in
Gaubert.87 Applying Gaubert, the court held that in this case, the conduct
in controversy—inmate classification and housing placement decisions—
was “discretionary in nature” and therefore met the first prong.88 The
court reasoned that only when a federal employee violates a specific
prescription in federal law does the discretionary function exception not
apply.89 After making this point, the court explained how Shivers did not
name a federal statute, regulation or policy that specifically prescribed a
course of action that the prison employees here failed to follow.90
Moving on to the second prong of the Gaubert test, the court referenced
a prior decision in the Eleventh Circuit in which inmate classification
and housing placement decisions were held to be “part and parcel of the
inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving
security within our nation’s prisons.”91 In Cohen, this type of conduct was
held to meet both prongs of the test set out in Gaubert.92 The court in
Cohen reasoned that while there was a statute that imposed a general
duty of care to protect prisoners on the BOP, it left the BOP personnel
with discretion about how that duty was to be accomplished and therefore

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Shivers, 1 F.4th at 930.
Id. at 932 (citing Kiiskila, 466 F.2d at 626; Linder, 937 F.3d at 1087).
Kiiskila, 466 F.2d at 626–27; Linder, 937 F.3d at 1088.
Kiiskila, 466 F.2d at 628; Linder, 937 F.3d at 1092.
Kiiskila, 466 F.2d at 628; Linder, 937 F.3d at 1o90.
Shivers, 1 F.4th at 931.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id.
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warranted the applicability of the discretionary function exception.93 The
court in Shivers explained that the actions by the government employees
in the case at hand, being of the same type, also fell within the
discretionary function exception.94
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the way in which Shivers
argued his constitutional claim exclusion would work in practice.95 The
court seemed to take issue with two types of claims, state tort law and
federal constitution law, being tried in a single FTCA claim. The plaintiff
in such a case would have to show negligence under state law and then
defeat the discretionary function exception by proving the same conduct
also breached a constitutional right. The district court in a case like this
would have to instruct the jury that, even if the defendant in such a case
were found to be negligent under state law, the government is still
immune to suit unless the plaintiff also proves a federal constitution
claim.96
C. Bivens Claim
The court’s analysis of the Bivens claim in Shivers began with it
expressing the need under the PLRA for an inmate to exhaust all
administrative remedies before bringing such a claim.97 The court then
explained the two-step process that should be applied when deciding on
a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust.98 Next, the court went into
detail about the relevant grievance process to be followed in this case. As
explained above, these steps include the filing of BP-8, BP-9, BP-10, and
BP-11 forms.
At issue in this case was whether the appeal to the General Counsel
(form BP-11) was filed.99 The court disagreed with Shivers’s claim that
the district court clearly erred in finding that he failed to submit his
BP-11 form.100 Instead, the court held that the district court had
substantial evidence to support its finding.101 This evidence submitted by
the government included a declaration by a BOP paralegal stating that
Shivers had not submitted the form to the Central Office level and an
exhibit that showed no entry of the form into the BOP’s SENTRY system.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Shivers, 1 F.4th at 929.
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id. at 935 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
Id. at 935.
Id.
Id. at 936.
Id.
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The court then pointed to Shivers’s declaration that had a BP-11 form
attached, in which Shivers stated was a “true and correct copy” of the
form he submitted, was unsigned.102 Therefore, the court found no error
in the dismissal of Shivers’s Bivens claim by the lower court.103
D. Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part
Circuit Judge Wilson concurred in the majority’s judgment affirming
the district court’s dismissal of Shiver’s Bivens claim.104 Wilson, however,
dissented from the majority’s decision on whether the discretionary
function exception applies to government employees who violate the
Constitution. According to Wilson, because government employees do not
have discretion to violate the Constitution, the exception cannot apply.
Wilson then pointed to the fact that most other circuits that have
encountered this issue have held that the discretionary function
exception does not shield the government from liability under the FTCA
when the conduct is also unconstitutional.105
Although Wilson agreed with the majority that the conduct in this case
met the first prong of the Gaubert test—that it involved an element of
judgment—he disagreed that it met the second prong. Wilson did not
believe that the discretionary function exception was only inapplicable in
cases in which a federal employee acts contrary to a specific prescription
in federal law, as the majority had reasoned.106 Instead, Wilson argued
that this inquiry is only relevant when considering the first prong of the
Gaubert test. Wilson then distinguished this case from Cohen, stating
that the case at hand asked a different question: Does a prison official’s
decisions about the placement of inmates fall under the discretionary
function exception when the plaintiff alleges that the decision was not
only tortious but also violated a constitutional right? Wilson’s answer to
this question was no. Ultimately, for Wilson, the problem with the
majority’s opinion is that the government “has no discretion to violate the
Federal Constitution [,]”107 and unconstitutional action does not involve
a permissible exercise of policy judgment.108

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id. (Wilson, C.J., concurring in part)
Id.
Id. at 937.
Id. (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649 (1980)).
Id. at 937.
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V. IMPLICATIONS
Through Shivers, the Eleventh Circuit became the second appellate
court to hold that the discretionary function exception shields a
government employee from liability under the FTCA when they violate
the Constitution.109 The circuit’s reasoning was contrary to the one
applied by the Supreme Court in Berkovitz. In Berkovitz, the Supreme
Court held that the discretionary function exception does not apply if a
“federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of
action for an employee to follow.”110 This is due to the employee lacking
a rightful option but to adhere to the directive, and therefore there is no
discretion for the exception to protect.111
If the same logic is applied to the circumstances of the current case,
then it follows that the exception would not shield government conduct
that violates the Constitution. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that
the government “has no ‘discretion’ to violate the Federal Constitution;
its dictates are absolute and imperative.”112 Holding the discretionary
function exception applies to unconstitutional conduct leads to an
illogical result: government employees that violate the mandates of a
statute, rule, or policy are liable under the FTCA but those whose “onduty conduct [is] so egregious that it violates the more fundamental
requirements of the Constitution” are protected from suit.113
The decision in Shivers limits the remedy available to those whose
constitutional rights are violated by the negligence of government
employees. Such a claim is no longer actionable under the FTCA and
must be brought as a Bivens claim. The problem with this outcome is that
the two claims come from different sources of law. The basis of an FTCA
claim is state law, while the basis for a Bivens action is constitutional
law.114 A Bivens action is also fairly limited. This may result in many
deserving state tort victims being barred from recovery and not being
made whole.
This decision may also encourage more discretion to be given to
government officials. This outcome seems more likely because if there is
no specific policy on a given matter and decisions are increasingly left up

109. Id. at 936; Loumiet, 828 F.3d at 939; Limone, 579 F.3d at 102 ; Raz, 343 F.3d at 948
(holding that the discretionary function exception does not shield government employees
who violate the constitution from liability under the FTCA). But see Kiiskila, 466 F.2d at
628 (holding the opposite).
110. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
111. Id.
112. Owen, 445 U.S. at 649.
113. Loumiet, 828 F.3d at 944–45.
114. Id. at 945–46.
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to their employees’ discretion, then the government can evade suit under
the FTCA. An increase in the amount of discretion given to government
employees will lead to a less precise standard of conduct. Such an
outcome would be bad for the public. For example, without a clear
standard of how prison officials should handle inmates, inmates may not
know when they have been legally wronged. Federal prisoners in the
Eleventh Circuit would be treated differently and most likely with less
care than those in other circuits. Members of the public should have a
general idea of what is and is not appropriate conduct from government
employees. Federal employees also deserve to have a clear standard to
abide by so they can avoid suit themselves.
Left to the discretion of the individual employee, there could be
different treatment and ways of conducting business in multiple aspects
of government, leading to an unclear standard for government conduct.
The decision in Shivers seems to only benefit the federal government by
protecting it from suit for the misfeasance of its employees. Meanwhile,
many torts victims are left without a possible redress, and both liability
and responsibility are shifted to federal employees.

